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THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL ABOLISHMENT OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE HAS BEEN
PAVED BY BOZMAN V. BOZMAN!
I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite vast criticism and overwhelming dissent by almost all of the
states, Maryland remains one of only five jurisdictions that still recognizes contributory negligence. 2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
justified Maryland's status as a contributory negligence jurisdiction
with its decision in Hamson v. Montgomery County Board of Education to
defer abrogation to the legislature. 3 The legislature's failure to act in
the twenty years since this decision has created a need to reexamine
judicial abrogation.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has reserved the abrogation of
many common law doctrines for the legislature. 4 Prior to 2003, the
court used this justification to preserve the interspousal immunity
doctrine in a line of cases beginning in 1952. 5 In Bozman v. Bozman,6
however, the court recognized interspousal immunity's deficiencies
and abolished the doctrine. 7 In reexamining its previous deference to
the legislature, the Court of Appeals identified the interspousal immunity doctrine as "an antiquated rule of law which, in our view, runs
counter to prevailing societal norms and, therefore, has lived out its
usefulness."8
A similar rationale can be applied to Maryland's contributory negligence doctrine. Contributory negligence is an antiquated doctrine
abolished by almost all of the states 9 and common law countries, in1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003).
See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
See 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983).
See, e.g., State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 728 A.2d 712 (1999) (distinction between principals and accessories); Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md.
51,415 A.2d 255 (1979) (governmental immunity); Creaser v. Owens, 267
Md. 238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972) (the "boulevard rule"); Howard v. Bishop
Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968) (charitable
immunity); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966) (lex loci delicti).
See generally Stokes v. Ass'n of Indep. Taxi Operators, Inc., 248 Md. 690,237
A.2d 762 (1968); Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961);
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957); Gregg v.
Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952).
376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003).
See id. at 496, 830 A.2d at 471.
Id. at 467-68, 830 A.2d at 454.
See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative:
Which Is the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 41, 44-45 (2003).
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia
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eluding England, where it originated. 1O Efforts in Maryland to pass a
comparative negligence bill in the legislature have failed. II It is time
to reevaluate the court's role. Judicial action is necessary, and is the
next logical step in abolishing contributory negligence in Maryland.
This comment will first examine the origins of contributory and
comparative negligence. 12 It will then demonstrate how the ruling in
Bozman reflects willingness by the Court of Appeals to abrogate antiquated doctrines, the abolition of which it previously deferred to the
legislature. I3 Finally, it will suggest a form of comparative negligence
for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to adopt. 14
II.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

A.

The Origins oj Contributory Negligence

The concept of contributory negligence originated in an 1806 English case, Butterfield v. Forrester. I5 Butterfield was injured when his
horse struck a pole that Forrester had left in the road. I6 Because the
jury found that Butterfield had been riding too fast to see and avoid
the obstruction, the court denied recovery.I7 Lord Ellenborough
stated, "One person being in fault will not dispense with another's
using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support
this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant,
and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff."18
This concept was said to have developed from a judge-perceived
need to control plaintiff-minded juries. 19 In addition, courts sought

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

19.

remain contributory negligence jurisdictions. Id. at 45 n.27, 56. See also infra Part III.
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.w.2d 511,515 (Mich. 1979). England replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence in the
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Ceo. 6, ch. 28
(Eng.).
See infra Part III.C.2.
Infra Parts II, III.
Infra Parts IV,V.
Infra Part VI.
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (KB. 1809). See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 295 Md. 442, 449, 456 A.2d 894,897 (1983).
Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926.
Id. at 926-27.
Id.
Joseph W. Little, Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Propartional Liability, 41 ALA. L. REv. 13,20 (1989). One commentator explained
the origin of "plaintiff-minded juries":
When simple disputes between neighbors had formed the bulk of
tort litigation, as had been the case in the past, jurors had been
able to dispose of such cases easily, fairly, and properly. When,
however, big and remote corporate defendants, especially railroads, entered the scene, the average juror, often regarding such
defendants to be intruders as well as immensely rich, became plaintiff-minded.
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to limit the liability of newly developing industry.20 Several underlying policies also existed, including "punishment of the negligent
plaintiff, encouragement to comply with the community's standard of
care, and the alleged inability of juries to measure the amount of damage attributable to the plaintiffs own negligence."21 Mter being first
recognized in the United States in Smith v. Smith in 1824,22 contributory negligence was later adopted by all of the states and the District
of Columbia. 23
B.

Contributory Negligence in Maryland

In 1847, Maryland adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence
in Irwin v. Sprigg.24 Then, in 1966, Maryland adopted the Second Restatement of Torts' definition of contributory negligence in Craig v.
Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc. 25 It defined contributory negligence as
"conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to
which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiffs harm."26 Therefore, if a
plaintiffs own negligence contributed to his injuries, he could recover
nothing from the defendant.
C.

Efforts to Ameliorate the Harshness of Contributory Negligence

Contributory negligence has been highly criticized for its unfairness
to plaintiffs, arising from the doctrine's ability to relieve a defendant
of liability for even the smallest degree of fault by the plaintiff.27
States that have judicially abrogated the doctrine have recognized its
harsh nature. 28 For example, in Hoffman v. jones,29 the Supreme

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
189, 198-99 (1950).
Harrison, 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 897. But see Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in North Carolina, 18
CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 12 (1996) (arguing that the theory "that a particular
court adopted a particular legal doctrine because of the court's unspoken
desire to assist the industrial revolution is pure speculation").
Harrison, 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 898.
19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 41.
See 6 Gill 200, 205 (Md. 1847).
244 Md. 95, 97, 222 A.2d 836, 837 (1966).
Id.
See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 465, 456
A.2d 894, 906 (1983) (Davidson, j., dissenting).
See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975) ("[TJhe contributory negligence rule yields unfair results which can no longer be justified."); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. 1981) ("The predominant
argument for its abandonment rests, of course, upon the undeniable inequity and injustice in casting an entire accidental loss upon a plaintiff whose
negligence combined with another's negligence in causing the loss suffered, no matter how trifling plaintiffs negligence might be.").
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Court of Florida noted that the underlying principles of the doctrine
no longer justifY its unfairness to a negligent plaintiff.30 In her dissent
in Harrison, judge Davidson, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, recognized this unfairness:
I am not convinced that in Maryland, society's concept of
fairness differs in any significant degree from the concept of
fairness shared in all of those common law and civil law jurisdictions throughout the world that have abandoned the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of the doctrine of
comparative negligence. I am convinced that in Maryland,
as elsewhere, the doctrine of contributory negligence has become unsound under the circumstances of modern life. 31
Prior to the development of comparative negligence, courts made
several efforts to lessen the harshness of contributory negligence. Examples of such ameliorative efforts include the last clear chance doctrine, the safety statute exception, and the greater-degree-of-blame
exception. 32 All three exceptions provide recovery for plaintiffs, even
if they are contributorily negligent. 33
In 1868, Maryland adopted the last clear chance doctrine,34 allowing recovery by a plaintiff, who would otherwise be denied recovery, if the defendant had the last chance to avoid the accident. 35 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland denied assertions that the adoption of
the last clear chance doctrine "indicate[d] any general dissatisfaction
with the contributory negligence doctrine."36 Most jurisdictions, however, viewed the last clear chance doctrine as a means to lessen the
harshness of contributory negligence. 37 Despite the adoption of these
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

36.
37.

280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 436.
Harrison, 295 Md. at 465-66, 456 A.2dat 906 (Davidson, j., dissenting).
Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 41.
See id. at 41-42. The safety statute exception provides recovery "if the defendant's negligence consisted of the breach of a statute specifically designed
to protect a class of persons unable to protect themselves against defendant's negligence." ld. The greater-degree-of-blame exception provides recovery "if the defendant's conduct was 'intentional' or 'reckless.''' Id. at 42.
Finally, the last clear chance doctrine applies if the "defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid harming the plaintiff." Id.
N. Cent. Ry. v. State, 29 Md. 420, 43&-37 (1868).
Edward S. Digges, Jr. & Robert Dale Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland:
The Time Has Come, 41 MD. L. REv. 227, 278 (1982).
Harrison, 295 Md. at 451,456 A.2d at 898.
See, e.g., Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1106 (N.M. 2003)
(stating that doctrines such as last clear chance "existed as judicial escape
mechanisms to avoid the sometimes harsh results of contributory negligence"); Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584,588 (W.Va. 1981) ("[TJhe doctrine of last clear chance was a judicial development to modifY the
harshness of the contributory negligence rule.").
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exceptions, the unfairness of the doctrine prevailed and many states
began to seek an alternative measure-comparative negligence. 38

III.
A.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

The Origins of the Comparative Negligence Doctrine

In 1858, Illinois became the first state to experiment with comparative negligence. 39 This experiment failed and Illinois courts returned
to contributory negligence twenty-seven years later. 4o In 1981, however, the Supreme Court of Illinois readopted comparative
negligence. 41
In the 1860s, Georgia became the first state to permanently adopt
comparative negligence. 42 Using language from previous cases decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the state legislature enacted
two statutes. 43 One dealt strictly with negligent railroad operations,
while the other stated more broadly that a defendant would not be
relieved from liability simply because of the plaintiffs negligence. 44
The first federal acknowledgment of comparative negligence occurred in 1908 when Congress enacted the second Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA), which eliminated the previous bar to recovery
for employees of common carriers whose negligence contributed to
the accident. 45 The damages were diminished in proportion to the
amount of an employee's negligence. 46 Only six states adopted comparative negligence statutes over the next sixty years. 47 During the
late 1960s and 1970s, however, states began to adopt comparative negligence at a more rapid pace. 48 As of 2005, forty-six states have replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence. 49
38. See infra Part III.
39. See Galena & Chicago Union RR v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858).
40. See Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 3 N.E. 456 (Ill. 1885); see also Alvis v.
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ill. 1981).
41. Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
42. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 42-43.
43. [d. at 42; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 4~291 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7
(2000).
44. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 42-43.
45. Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149,35 Stat. 66 (codified as amended
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000»; Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43.
46. See 45 U.S.C. § 53.
47. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64122 (Michie Supp. 2003) (originally enacted in 1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 156 (West 2003) (enacted in 1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1999) (enacted in 1910); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1995) (enacted in
1913); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-9-2 (Michie Supp. 2003) (enacted in 1941);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997) (enacted in 1931).
48. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43.
49. [d.
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Types of Comparative Negligence

There are two main types of comparative negligence: pure and
modified. Pure comparative negligence requires each party to pay his
or her proportion of the damages. 50 Fourteen states have adopted the
pure form. 51 The majority of states that judicially adopted comparative negligence chose the pure form. 52
Modified comparative negligence exists in the remaining comparative negligence states. 53 There are three approaches to modified comparative negligence: the fifty percent rule, the forty-nine percent rule,
and the slight/gross rule. 54 The fifty percent rule, used in twenty-one
jurisdictions,55 allows a plaintiff to recover if his or her negligence was
not greater than fifty percent of the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence combined. 56 Similarly, the forty-nine percent rule, followed by
50. See Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981).
51. Ar..AsKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505
(West 2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.31 (West Supp. 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1999); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997); R.1. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4
(1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 2004); Hilen v. Hays, 673
S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d
511,519-20 (Mich. 1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.w.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo.
1983); Scott, 634 P.2d at 1242.
52. Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 719. Nine of the twelve states that judicially adopted
comparative negligence adopted the pure form. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d
1037,1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226,1243
(Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v.
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d
742, 754 (Iowa 1982); Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 719; Placek, 275 N.W.2d at 51920; Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15-16; Scott, 634 P.2d at 1242. The legislatures
of Illinois and Iowa, however, have since enacted modified comparative
negligence statutes. See 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998).
53. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43-44.
54. [d.

55. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 8132 (1999); HAw. REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1993); 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-2-5, 34-51-2-6 (Michie
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
231, § 85 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2003); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Michie 2002);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West
2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 13-14 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 31.600 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 33.001-33.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004-2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1036 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 11-109 (Michie 2003); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784
(S.C. 1991).
56. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 44. These laws generally state that a
plaintiff may recover if his or her negligence is "not greater than" that of
the defendant. [d.
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ten states,57 prohibits recovery if the plaintiff was more than forty-nine
percent negligent. 58 Under the slight/gross rule, a plaintiff can only
recover if he or she is slightly negligent, or if the defendant is grossly
negligent relative to plaintiff's negligence. 59 This form is used only in
South Dakota. 60
Michigan created an exception to these forms in adopting a hybrid
of pure and modified comparative negligence. 61 Michigan's comparative negligence statute provides that if a party is more than fifty percent negligent, they are entitled to economic damages proportionate
to their fault, but are not entitled to noneconomic damages. 62
C.

Judicial vs. Legislative Adoption

Of the forty-six comparative negligence states, twelve states judicially adopted comparative negligence. 63 These decisions have occurred even in states in which the courts initially deferred such a
change to the legislature. 64 Although legislatures in two of those
states subsequently enacted statutes that changed the form of com par57. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 2003); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-111 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-11-7, 51-12-33 (2000);
IDAHO CODE § tHl01 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a, 60-258b
(1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185.09 (Michie 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-02 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-38, 78-27-40 (2002); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52,57 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879,885 (W. Va. 1979); Robinette & Sherland, supra
note 9, at 45 n.29.
58. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 44. These laws generally allow a
plaintiff to recover if his or her negligence is "not as great as" the defendant's. Id.
59. !d.
60. Id. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-9-2 (Michie Supp. 2003).
61. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 45. See MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 600.2958, 600.2959 (West 2000). Michigan's statute provides:
In an action based on tort ... the court shall reduce the damages
by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose
injury or death the damages are based .... If that person's percentage of fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the other
person or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the court
shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative
fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are
based ... and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded.
Id. § 600.2959 (West 2000).
62. See Id. § 600.2959.
63. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Hoffman v.Jones, 280
So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 1981);
Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Iowa 1982); Hilen v. Hays, 673
S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d
511,514 (Mich. 1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983);
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1236 (N.M. 1981); Nelson v. Concrete Supply
Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52,
53 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va.
1979); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975).
64. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
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ative negligence from pure to modified, they agreed with the courts'
decision to replace contributory negligence with comparative
negligence. 65

1.

The Rationale for Judicial Adoption

The decisions of the judicially acting courts follow similar rationales. Their primary support for judicial action is the judicial origin
of contributory negligence. 66 In Tennessee, for example, the court
stated, "We recognize that this action could be taken by our General
Assembly. However, legislative inaction has never prevented judicial
abolition of obsolete common law doctrines, especially those, such as
contributory negligence, conceived in the judicial womb."67
Other rationales have also been used to support judicial action.
The Supreme Court of Michigan examined both the strengths and
potential weaknesses of judicial action, in effect summarizing the justification of many of the judicially acting states. 68 The court acknowledged the arguments in favor of legislative action, but provided an
equally strong, if not stronger, argument in favor of judicial action. 69
The court stated:
.
First is the question which of these two bodies is better
equipped to understand the nature and implications of the
problem and to make an informed choice from available alternatives. It is fashionable to suppose that the investigatory
opportunities of the legislature establish its superior credentials in this respect. . .. But on the question of contributory negligence, one cannot very well dispute the unique judicial experience
and preoccupation . ... In a nutshell, this is preeminently lawyer's law. 70
The Supreme Court of Michigan further supported judicial action
in stating th~t most statutes are too concise, and thus create questions
that the courts must later resolve?l Courts, unlike legislatures, have
65. See 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668.3 (West 1998).
66. See, e.g., Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049 (stating that "increasing [sic] it is perceived
that a rule which is judicial in origin can be, and appropriately should be,
altered by the institution which was its creator"); Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 895
(citing previous cases that "found that contributory negligence is a judicially created doctrine which can be altered or totally replaced by the court
which created it"); Placek, 275 N.W.2d at 517 (stating that "when dealing
with judge-made law, this Court in the past has not disregarded its corrective responsibility in the proper case").
67. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 56.
68. Placek, 275 N.W.2d at 517-19.
69. Id. at 518.
70. Id. (quoting John C. Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By
Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REv. 239, 279-80 (1976».
71. Id. (citing Fleming, supra note 70, at 281). In recognizing this need for
subsequent court action, the Alaska Supreme Court noted:
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the ability to foresee these potential issues and can therefore address
such questions before they are actually brought before the court.
Although strong arguments exist in favor of legislative action, many
courts have both recognized the importance of and supported judicial
action. As demonstrated by the twelve courts that have already acted,
judicial abrogation is a well-supported course of action in the abolishment of contributory negligence.

2.

Maryland's Preference for Legislative Action

Deference to the legislature in Maryland is primarily attributed to
public policy:
[W] e are unable to say that the circumstances of modern life
has so changed as to render contributory negligence a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the needs of the people
of Maryland. In the final analysis, whether to abandon the
doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative
negligence involves fundamental and basic public policy considerations properly to be addressed by the legislature. 72
Each year between 1996 and 2002, Maryland legislators introduced
comparative negligence bills in the House or Senate. 73 The General
Assembly has failed to enact any of them. In her dissent in Harrison,
Judge Davidson pointed out that "[t]his Court has repeatedly held
that the Legislature's failure to enact legislation is a 'weak reed upon
which to lean' in drawing a positive inference of legislative intent.,,74
Instead, there may be other explanations for the legislature's failure
Our adoption of this new principle does not, of course, end our
judicial tasks in this area. Subsidiary questions and problems concerning the relationship of the new rule to other doctrines of tort
law must necessarily be adjudicated in the future. We must, for the
most part, await future cases for the further development of law in
this field.
Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049-50.
72. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d
894,905 (1983).
73. H.D. 836, 1996 Leg., 410th Sess. (Md. 1996) (withdrawn); H.D. 846, 1997
Leg., 411th Sess. (Md. 1997) (receiving an unfavorable report from House
Judiciary Committee); S. 618, 1998 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md. 1998) (receiving
an unfavorable report from Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); H.D.
551, 1999 Leg., 413th Sess. (Md. 1999) (receiving an unfavorable report
from the House Judiciary Committee); S. 779, 2000 Leg., 414th Sess. (Md.
2000) (receiving an unfavorable report from the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); S. 483, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001) (receiving an
unfavorable report from the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); S.
872, 2002 Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002) (no action).
74. Harrison, 295 Md. at 466, 456 A.2d at 906 (Davidson, j., dissenting) (citing
Auto. Trade Ass'n of Md., Inc. v. Ins. Comm'r of Md., 292 Md. 15, 24, 437
A.2d 199, 203 (1981); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 406,
354 A.2d 817, 820-21 (1976)).
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to act. 75 For example, Judge Davidson suggested that the legislature's
failure to create an effective comparative negligence statute may be
the result of insufficient bills. 76 There are many collateral issues associated with the adoption of comparative negligence, and a statute that
does not address these issues may be viewed as ineffective. 77 In addition, the legislature may deem doctrinal change more appropriate for
the court to evaluate on a case-by-case basis. 78 Judge Davidson emphasized, "[LJegislative inaction here does not constitute an impediment
to abrogation of the doctrine of contributory negligence by judicial
decision."79
IV.

TIME FOR A CHANGE

Maryland's reluctance to judicially abolish contributory negligence
was specifically articulated in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of
Education. 80 According to the Court of Appeals, contributory negligence is a "fundamental principle of Maryland negligence law, one
deeply imbedded in the common law of this State."81 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland observed that Maryland case law does not indicate dissatisfaction with contributory negligence, and a societal need
to abrogate the doctrine did not exist in Maryland; however, it is almost universally considered antiquated and outdated with respect to
modern concepts of tort law. 82
The doctrine of interspousal immunity is similarly an antiquated
common law doctrine, but it was ultimately abrogated by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland. An analysis of the court's rationale in Bozman v.
Bozman, therefore, is useful in demonstrating the court's willingness to
judicially abrogate such a common law doctrine when it is no longer
deemed useful.

A.

The Abrogation of Interspousal Immunity

Interspousal immunity developed out of the concept that a husband
and wife were one entity.83 The Married Women's Act of 1898
75. Id. (citing Police Comm'r of Bait. v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 420-21, 379 A.2d
1007, 1012 (1977); Hearst Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation,
269 Md. 625, 644, 308 A.2d 679, 689 (1973)).
76. See id. at 466, 456 A.2d at 907. Senate Bill 872 of 2002 succinctly stated that
contributory negligence may not bar a recovery, that damages are to be
"diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the
plaintiff," and that the effect of the statute is prospective. See S. 872, 2002
Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002).
77. See Harrison, 295 Md. at 466, 456 A.2d at 907.
78. Harrison, 295 Md. at 466, 456 A.2d at 907.
79. Id.
80. 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983).
81. Id. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902.
82. Id.; see infra Part IV.B.l.
83. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 244, 462 A.2d 506, 507 (1983) (stating
that '''[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law . . . .
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changed this view by granting married women certain rights independent of their marriage. 84 The Supreme Court explained, however,
that this Act did not extend to interspousal immunity, stating that
"[t]he statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the
husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions
of tort which, at common law, must be brought in the joint names of
herself and husband."85 Those opposed to the abrogation of interspousal immunity argued that abrogation would disrupt the peace and
tranquility of marriage and encourage fraudulent claims. 86 Changes
in society, however, led the courts to question these justifications. For
example, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated in Brown v. Gossel'7
that "[t]he fear that relaxation of the common law rule will open the
door to fraudulent and fictitious claims, especially against insurance
companies, has less force than the argument of 'domestic peace and
£' 1"
J.e
ICity. , "88
Maryland also began to question the validity of interspousal immunity. In Lusby v. Lusby,89 the Court of Appeals created a narrow exception to interspousal immunity.90 This exception was later defined as
one that abrogates immunity "whenever the tort committed against
the spousal victim is not only intentional, as in assault and battery, but
'outrageous,' as where the errant spouse's conduct transcends common decency and accepted practices."91
In 1983, the Court of Appeals took the next step toward the full
abrogation of inters po usa1 immunity in Boblitz v. Boblitz,92 holding that
the doctrine could not be applied in negligence cases. 93 The court,
after examining the rationale of other interspousal immunity states,
cited the prevention of an increase in trivial claims and the need for

84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.

Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend
almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage."') (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*430).
See Married Women's Act, 1898 Md. Laws 457 (current version at MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-204 (1999)). The Act provided that "[m]arried women
shall have power ... to sue ... for torts committed against them, as fully as
if they were unmarried." [d.
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910).
Boblitz, 296 Md. at 255-57, 462 A,2d at 512-13.
262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
[d. at 484. The Supreme Court of Arizona also questioned such arguments:
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity cannot be supported by
an antiquated and narrow 'unity' doctrine that perpetuates the fiction of female disability if not inferiority. Whatever logic the unity
doctrine had in times gone by, it cannot operate today as a reason
for supporting the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.
Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 881 (Ariz. 1982).
283 Md. 334, 390 A,2d 77 (1978).
[d. at 357-58, 390 A,2d at 88-89.
Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 664, 420 A,2d 1249, 1251 (1980).
296 Md. 242, 462 A,2d 506 (1983).
[d. at 275, 462 A,2d at 522.
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legislative action among the six reasons for retention of the doctrine. 94 Mter analyzing the rationale of states that have abrogated the
doctrine, the court found "no reasonable basis" or "subsisting public
policy" justifYing abrogation of the doctrine. 95
In the years following Boblitz, the court continued to defer any action regarding full abrogation to the legislature. Twenty years after
Boblitz, however, the court judicially abolished interspousal immunity
in Bozman v. Bozman. 96 In reaching this holding, the court considered
many factors, including its right to judicially change common law doctrines. 97 Although the court had repeatedly declined to judicially abrogate interspousal immunity, the Bozman court determined that the
need for change far outweighed any concerns of stare decisis. 98
B.

The Effect of Bozman v. Bozman and Its Parallels to Contributory
Negligence

The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Bozman found that interspousal immunity was no longer justified by its common law foundation. 99 The court looked to other jurisdictions and secondary
authority for support of this conclusion. Only four other states still
retained the doctrine.lO o The court recognized the weight of authority against interspousal immunity, stating that "the trend [since Boblitz] toward abrogation having continued and the weight of authority
having grown larger, we are fortified in that view [in favor of abrogation] ."101 In examining the rationale of Bozman, specifically, the abolishment of antiquated common law doctrines, other states' decisions,
and secondary authority, one can gain greater insight as to why the
court would judicially abrogate a common law doctrine.

1.

The Abolishment of Antiquated Common Law Doctrines

As times change and society progresses, courts amend common law
doctrines to conform to current situations. Often, these doctrines are
94. Id. at 256-57,462 A.2d at 513. These two reasons are also cited for retaining
contributory negligence. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.,
295 Md. 442,455-56, 456 A.2d 894, 900-01 (1983). The other reasons for
retention were "[t]he unity of husband and wife," "[i]nterspousal tort actions will destroy the harmony of the marital relationship," [r]etention of
the doctrine will prevent collusive and fraudulent claims," and" [d]ivorce
and criminal courts furnish adequate redress." Id.
95. See Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
96. 376 Md. 461, 497, 830 A.2d 450, 471 (2003).
97. Id. at 483-85, 830 A.2d at 463-64.
98. Id. at 493-95,830 A.2d at 469-70. The court stated that "it is eminently wise
of this Court to abrogate a doctrine that is 'a vestige of the past [and] no
longer suitable to our people.'" Id. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470 (alteration in
original) (quoting Respondent'S Brief).
99. Id. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466.
100. Id. at 487, 830 A.2d at 466.
101. Id. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466.
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abolished because they have become essentially useless. This rationale was articulated by the court in Bozman and can also be said of
contributory negligence. 102
In adopting comparative negligence, the Supreme Court of California emphasized the unfairness of the doctrine as it relates to today's
society:
It is unnecessary for us to catalogue the enormous amount
of critical comment that has been directed over the years
against the 'all-or-nothing' approach of the doctrine of contributory negligence. The essence of that criticism has been
constant and clear: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion
to fault. Against this have been raised several arguments in
justification, but none have proved even remotely adequate
to the task. The basic objection to the doctrine-grounded
in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is
based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent
of liability-remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent
notions of fairness. 103

Retaining contributory negligence, therefore, is no longer justified by
the policies upon which it was developed. This fundamental unfairness has led forty-six states to abolish this antiquated doctrine.

2.

The Influence of Other States' Decisions

In identifying the influence of other states' decisions, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Bozman stated that although not binding,
these decisions may be used as persuasive authority.104
In Bozman, the court analyzed the decisions of other states since its
previous decision in Boblitz, and noted that the vast majority of states
had abrogated the doctrine. lOS Specifically, the court observed that
judicial abrogation occurred in nine of the twelve states that recognized interspousal immunity at the time of Boblitz. 106 One did so by
statute, and the other two abrogated the doctrine in part. 107
In the contributory negligence context, since Harrison, seven additional states changed to comparative negligence. lOS Four of these
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 467-68, 830 A.2d at 454.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Cal. 1975).
Bozman, 376 Md. at 490, 830 A.2d at 467.
Id. at 487, 830 A.2d at 465.
Id.
Id.
See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 n.10,
456 A.2d 894, 901 n.10 (1983) (listing states that retained contributory negligence at that time); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2505, 12-2509
(West 2003) (enacted in 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (1999) (enacted in 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-2-5, 34-51-2-6 (Michie 1998) (enacted in 1998); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v.
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states did so judicially,109 one of which-Missouri-initially deferred
action to the legislature. 110
As with interspousal tort immunity, the decisions of other jurisdictions should be persuasive. It is therefore important to compare the
rationales of contributory negligence states with those in which it has
been judicially abrogated.

a.

Contributory Negligence Jurisdictions

Only Maryland, Alabama, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District
of Columbia remain contributory negligence jurisdictions. 111 These
jurisdictions recognize the antiquated nature of the doctrine, but continue to apply it in their courts. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina, for example, acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's
classification of contributory negligence as "discredited" in their decision to retain the doctrineY2 Associate Judge Farrell of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals stated in a concurring opinion that "the
more I participate in decisions applying the doctrines of negligence,
contributory negligence and last clear chance, the more I am persuaded that serious thought should be given to adopting some form of
comparative negligence in this jurisdiction."1l3
In Alabama, a state similarly struggling with the decision of whether
to abolish contributory negligence, Justice Jones's dissenting opinion
expressed many of the problems encountered with such a standard. 114
He recognized that "UJurors tend to find themselves caught between
the judge's instruction on contributory negligence and their own
common concepts of the logical link between fault and liability."115
Therefore, contributory negligence creates two extreme choiCes for
the jury: either to award the plaintiff the damages they sought, or to

109.
110.

111.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399
S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56-57
(Tenn. 1992).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See Hamson, 295 Md. at 456,456 A.2d at 901; see also Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d
at 15.
See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9. The Court of Appeals of North
Carolina maintains that "[a]lthough forty-six states have abandoned the
doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence,
contributory negligence continues to be the law of this State until our Supreme Court overrules it or the General Assembly adopts comparative negligence." Alford v. Lowery, 573 S.E.2d 543, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Jones v. Rochelle, 479 S.E.2d 231,235 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997».
Bosley v. Alexander, 442 S.E.2d 82, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953».
District of Columbia v. Huysman, 650 A.2d 1323, 1328 (D.C. 1994) (Farrell,
j., concurring).
See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 820-22 (Ala. 1~80) (jones, j.,
dissenting) .
Id. at 821.
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prevent the plaintiff from collecting damages as a result of their negligence, however slight it may bey6
The courts of these states, however, refuse to act, most awaiting legislative action. The Supreme Court of Alabama, for example, acknowledged the criticism by both legal scholars and judges who have
abolished the doctrine, but maintained that such action is solely for
the legisiatureY7 This deference to the legislature is often criticized
in concurring and dissenting opinions. In a dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Hornsby of the Supreme Court of Alabama recognized that
"[j]udicial adoption of the comparative negligence analysis may become necessary due to the continuing legislative inertia on this subject."1l8 Judge Farrell of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
addressed similar concerns in stating that "assuming [legislative
change] does not take place, then the judges of this court should take
a hard look at whether there are not more rational principles by
which to resolve these cases in which so often the fault of both parties
is obvious to judges as well as juries."1l9
Although these courts share Maryland's reluctance to judicially abrogate the doctrine, forty-six other states, twelve of which judicially
abrogated the doctrine, demonstrate that the antiquated nature of
contributory negligence far outweighs any concerns relating to judicial action.

b. Judicially Abrogated Jurisdictions
At the time of Hamson, eight state supreme courts had judicially
adopted comparative negligence. 12o In Florida, the first state to judicially adopt comparative negligence, the court examined its own
power to replace contributory negligence. It had been previously suggested that only the legislature held this power. 121 In determining
that it could adopt comparative negligence, the court emphasized that
contributory negligence is "a judicial creation" and was "specifically
116. Id.
117. Id. at 817.
118. Campbell v. Ala. Power Co., 567 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Ala. 1990) (Hornsby,
Cj., dissenting) (quoting Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371,
381 n.8 (Ala. 1989)).
119. District of Columbia v. Huysman, 650 A.2d 1323, 1328 (D.C. 1994) (Farrell,
j., concurring).
120. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456, 456
A.2d 894, 901 (1983); see also Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska
1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1225, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898
(Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982); Placek
v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519-20 (Mich. 1979); Scott v.
Rizzo, 634 P.3d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981); Bradley v. Appalachia Power Co.,
256 S.E.2d 879,885 (W. Va. 1979).
121. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 434.
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judicially adopted in Florida."122 Because the court created contributory negligence, it also had the power to dispose of it.
Since Harrison, four additional states have judicially adopted comparative negligence. 123 These decisions have occurred even in states
that initially deferred such a change to the legislature. One of these
states-Missouri-was cited in Harrison, along with Alabama and Delaware, as one that has held "as a matter of policy that any such change
should be made by the legislature."124 Although this was true at the
time of Harrison, only eight months later the Supreme Court of Missouri judicially adopted comparative negligence. 125
In Steinman v. Strobe~ 126 a case deferring abrogation to the legislature, the Supreme Court of Missouri expressed concerns similar to
those expressed by Maryland's courts. For example, the court observed that "a change from contributory negligence to comparative
negligence encompasses much more than simply allowing plaintiffs
who are partially at fault to recover part of their damages."127 The
court explained that such a change included the need to examine
other doctrines, such as contribution, indemnity, and joint and several liability.128 The concurring opinion added that another argument in favor of legislative action is the court's inability to determine
the most efficient form of comparative negligence. 129 The concurring
opinion further stated, "No area of the law cries out more for a clear
policy established by democratically elected representatives."13o
Despite such strong and definitive language in favor of legislative
action, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Gustafson v. Benda,131 replaced contributory negligence with pure comparative negligence. 132
122. [d. See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886) Uudicially adopting contributory negligence).
123. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v. Benda, 661
S.W.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo. 1983); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d
783, 784 (S.C. 1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn.
1992).
124. Hamson, 295 Md. at 456, 456 A.2d at 901 (citing Steinman v. Strobel, 589
S.W.2d 293,294 (Mo. 1979)).
125. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15-16. Alabama remains a contributory negligence
state, Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 45 n.27, 56, while the Delaware
legislature has enacted a comparative negligence statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8132 (1999).
126. 589 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. 1979).
127. [d. at 294.
128. [d.
129. [d. (Welliver, j., concurring).
130. [d. at 295 (quoting Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899,
925 (Cal. 1978)). These opinions were followed by dissenting opinions
from Chief Justice Bardgett and Judge Donnelly, both of whom favored
judicial action, but differed in their opinions of which form of comparative
negligence to adopt. [d. at 295 (Bardgett, Cj., dissenting); id. at 297 (Donnelly, j., dissenting).
131. 661 S.W.2d 11 (1983) (en banc).
132. [d. at 15-16.
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The court described the change as the logical evolution from the last
clear chance doctrine. 133 The majority attributed its decision to a lack
of legislative action following Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead &
Kales CO.,134 stating that "[w]e now are past the time when we should
have resolved the uncertainty surrounding comparative fault by expanding the application of the doctrine."135 The dissent, however,
maintained that this decision was one for the General Assembly, 136
especially since the abrogation of contributory negligence was not
mentioned in the briefs or pleadings of either party.137 Chief Justice
Rendlen emphasized the ramifications of abrogating a doctrine that
had been in existence in the state for over 100 years. 138 His concerns
included, inter alia, a large volume of litigation, including appeals. 139
These concerns were reiterated injustice Gunns's dissent. 14o Despite
these dissenting opinions, the majority's decision has not been overruled, either by the courts or the legislature, to this date.
The twelve judicially adopting states demonstrate the ability of the
courts to successfully implement change. This trend began over thirty
years ago in Florida and continues to be successful. Its success is most
significant in Missouri, a state that had previously deferred such action
to the legislature.

3.

Secondary Authority

In addition to looking at other jurisdictions, the court in Bozman
looked to secondary authority. The Court of Appeals found "the
trend and, indeed, the great weight of authority, to be to move away
from the doctrine [of interspousal immunity] and in favor of changing the common law to abolish it, either fully or partially."141 In support of its decision, the court noted the position of legal scholars and
commentators in favor of abrogation. 142
A similar trend in authority exists with respect to contributory negligence. Most scholars and commentators are in favor of comparative
133. [d. at 13.
134. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (abandoning the concept of "active-passive negligence" in favor of "comparative fault" in multiple defendant cases).
135. Gustafson, 661 S.w.2d at 15.
136. See id. at 29 (Rendlen, Cj., dissenting).
137. [d. at 28.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 29.
140. See id. (Gunn,j., dissenting) ("We have pierced and circumvented the revetment so carefully designed to separate, segregate, preserve and distinguish
the identities and functions of judicial, legislative and executive
branches.") .
14l. Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 488, 830 A.2d 450, 466 (2003).
142. See id. at 483, 830 A.2d at 463 (citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 270,462
A.2d at 519-20 (1983)). See also FOWLER V. lfARpER & FLEMINCJAMES, JR., 1
THE LAw OF TORTS 645-46 (1956); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS 862-63 (4th ed. 1971).
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negligence. As early as 1950, scholars recognized the harshness of
contributory negligence. For example, in Comparative Negligence on the
March, Ernest A. Turk explained:
[Contributory negligence] may have had its merits in the
early days of the nineteenth century, when infant industry
stood in need of judicial help against the ravages which
might have been wrought by over-sympathetic juries. In an
age where men are pitted against the power and speed of
machines, however, the harshness of the doctrine becomes
overwhelming. 143
Similar attitudes concerning these doctrines have been expressed
since then, demonstrating the overwhelming agreement among scholars that the outdated doctrine of contributory negligence should be
replaced with comparative negligence. 144 As in Bozman, such secondary authority should be persuasive in the court's evaluation of these
two doctrines.
V.

RECOGNIZING THE OBSTACLES

As recognized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Bozman, the
decision to abolish contributory negligence differs from the abolishment of other common law doctrines. 145 The abrogation of contributory negligence involves the adoption of another doctrine that must
be adopted in a particular form. 146 The court, however, emphasized
its statement in Boblitz:

{W]e have never construed the doctrine oj stare decisis to inhibit us
from changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial decision
where we find, in light oj changed conditions or increased knowledge
that the rule has become so unsound in the circumstances modern
life, a vestige oj the past, no longer suitable to our people. 47

0l

Robert A. Leflar, a commentator on the subject, further identified
the obstacles created by judicial abrogation, stating that comparative
negligence "seems to call for the enactment of a comprehensive statute, with sections and subsections carefully worked out in advance by a
143. See Turk, supra note 19, at 201.
144. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 347 (1st Ed. 1974); see
also Robert E. Keeton, Comment on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory
Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 906 (1968);
William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 508 (1953).
145. Bozman, 376 Md. at 492-93,830 A.2d at 469 (quoting Boblitz, 296 Md. at 274,
462 A.2d at 521).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 493,830 A.2d at 468 (quoting Boblitz, 296 Md. at 274,462 A.2d at 52122 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442,
459,456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983))).
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legislative drafting committee aided by an advisory commission."148
Nevertheless, the judicially acting courts have made this transition
with ease, not concerning themselves with the different forms of comparative negligence. Most of these states have chosen the pure
form. 149
States choosing pure comparative negligence have emphasized the
fairness of this form. In support of its decision, the Supreme Court of
Michigan stated that the pure form best addresses the fault of both
parties. 150 The court continued by observing that "[w]hat pure comparative negligence does is hold a person fully responsible for his or
her acts and to the full extent to which they cause injury. That is
justice."151 The Supreme Court of Alaska stated that the pure form "is
the simplest to administer and which is best calculated to bring about
substantial justice in negligence cases."152
A recent law review article examined which doctrine, contributory
or comparative negligence, best achieves the goals of the tort system. 153 It examined the three primary policy aspects of torts: deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice. 154 The authors
determined that comparative negligence, specifically pure comparative negligence, best addresses these policy issues. 155 The authors defend their theory by stating that the pure form "is superior to
modified comparative negligence in achieving tort law's compensation goal" because pure comparative negligence does not preclude a
plaintiff from recovery.156
The fifty percent and forty-nine percent rules are associated with
similar criticism to that of contributory negligence. For example, the
Supreme Court of California noted that the " , [fifty] percent' system
simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a
different ground."157 In other words, a jury has the opportunity to
arbitrarily decide whether one will recover damages. With contributory negligence, the jury will decide whether to assign fault based on
whether they think the plaintiff should recover damages. Similarly, in
the fifty percent system, a juror distinction between a plaintiff being
fifty or fifty-one percent at fault will determine whether they will re148. Id. at 921. Most states, however, have not adopted such comprehensive statutes. Id. at 921-22.
149. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
150. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511,519 (Mich. 1979) (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 144, at 347).
151. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400, 429 (Mich. 1997)).
152. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975).
153. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 45-46.
154. Id. at 46.
155. Id. at 50, 51, 59.
156. Id. at 51.
157. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43 (Cal. 1975) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L.
REv. 1,25 (1953)).
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cover damages. Both are all or nothing approaches, but to a different
degree.
Only three judicially adopting states-South Carolina, Tennessee,
and West Virginia-adopted a modified form of comparative negligence. 15S West Virginia was the first judicially abrogated state to
choose a form other than pure comparative negligence. The court
reasoned that it did not want to allow recovery for a plaintiff who substantially contributed to the damages. 159 Instead, the court adopted
the forty-nine percent approach. 160
In adopting comparative negligence, the courts will have to carefully consider which form to adopt. Maryland's advantage, however, is
the long line of case law and legislative history from the other forty-six
comparative negligence states. 161 In addition, as demonstrated in
Iowa, the legislature can later change the form decided upon by the
courts. 162 Although this may create temporary confusion in the judicial system, it allows the legislature recourse if it is not satisfied with
the new doctrine's application to public policy.
VI.

A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

The majority of states that judicially adopted comparative negligence have chosen the pure form.163 Courts have justified adoption
of the pure form because it is more in accord with the fault-based
system of torts. 164 The modified form, however, seems to be a better
option for Maryland.
See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text.
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
Id.
Chief Justice Hornsby of the Supreme Court of Alabama, which has not yet
adopted comparative negligence, expressed a similar advantage:
The bench and the bar in each of the jurisdictions adopting the
doctrine of comparative negligence have proved themselves able to
overcome the problems attendant to change; they have overcome
those problems in order to implement a fairer system of justice.
Our bench and bar are no less able to overcome those problems. I
believe that our system would fairly and effectively resolve any
problems arising out of the change to the doctrine of comparative
negligence, as they arose.
Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (Ala. 1993)
(Hornsby, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
162. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998) (superseding Goetzman v. Wichern,
327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982), by designating a modified form of comparative negligence rather than the pure form).
163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (pointing out that" [the fifty percent] rule distorts the very principle it recognizes,
i.e., that persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious result. The partial rule simply lowers, but does not
eliminate, the bar of contributory negligence.") (quoting Friedrich K.
Juenger, Brieffor Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of
158.
159.
160.
161.
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The West Virginia supreme court offered convincing support for
the modified form:
The fundamental justification for the pure comparative negligence rule is its fairness in permitting everyone to recover
to the extent he is not at fault. Thus, the eye of the needle is
'no fault,' and we are asked not to think about the larger
aspect-the camel representing 'fault.' It is difficult, on theoretical grounds alone, to rationalize a system which permits
a party who is [ninety-five] percent at fault to have his day in
court as a plaintiff because he is [five] percent fault-free. 165
In addition to West Virginia, the two states to most recently judicially adopt comparative negligence-South Carolina and Tennessee-chose the modified form. 166 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
rejected the pure form of comparative fault because it theoretically
allows people to recover even if they substantially contributed to the
harm. 167 The court instead adopted the forty-nine percent rule because it "ameliorates the harshness of the common law rule while remaining compatible with a fault-based tort system."168
In deciding which form of modified comparative negligence to use,
it is important to recognize the significance of choosing a fifty percent
versus a forty-nine percent rule. The fifty-percent rule allows for recovery if the plaintiffs negligence is "not greater than" the defendant's negligence, while the forty-nine percent rule allows recovery
only if the plaintiffs negligence is "not as great as" the defendant's.169
This difference is significant because juries commonly find that the
parties are equally negligent. 17o In such a case, therefore, recovery
would be available only under the fifty-percent rule.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt the forty-nine percent rule. Adopting this form would ameliorate some of the state's
concerns regarding comparative negligence. Since recovery can only
occur if the plaintiffs negligence is less than fifty percent of the total
negligence, this form would deter frivolous claims and only provide
recovery to deserving plaintiffs who are not substantially responsible
for the harm.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsonson v. Construction Equipment Company, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 3,50 (1972)).
Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 883.
See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text.
See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992).
Id.
See supra note 56, 58.
See Prosser, supra note 144, at 494; see also Heather C. Webb, Comparative
Negligence-McIntyre v. Balentine: Tennessee Judicially Adopts the Doctrine of
Comparative Negligence, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1992).
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CONCLUSION

Chief Judge Gilbert of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
citing Harrison, appropriately summarized Maryland's position on
common law doctrines:
In light of the revision of the Restatement Second of Contracts and those pronouncements made by the courts of
some of our sister states, modification might be considered
the "modern trend." That does not mean, however, that Maryland will follow the "modern trend" parade. History demonstrates that, before they join a parade as marchers,
Maryland courts want to know where the parade is going. l71
In the twenty years since the Court of Appeals of Maryland delegated the responsibility of changing the common law to the legislature, the General Assembly has failed to act. A failure to act, however,
is not necessarily an indication of legislative disapproval. 172 In addition, as recently demonstrated in Bozman, the court's deference to the
legislature does not preclude the court from acting. Instead, as with
interspousal immunity, the antiquated nature of the doctrine far outweighs any rationale for patiently awaiting legislative action. Comparative negligence is no longer just a "modern trend." It is a necessity.
Maryland now knows where Chief Judge Gilbert's aforementioned
"parade" is going. Since Florida's adoption of comparative negligence
over thirty years ago, twelve states have judicially adopted the doctrine. All of the states to adopt comparative negligence have done so
with ease, even those whose judiciary acted. With this knowledge in
hand, it is time for the court to take immediate action and join the
parade.
Jennifer J Karangelen

171. Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 78 Md. App. 205, 252-53, 552 A.2d 1311,
1334 (1989) (Gilbert, CJ., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (criticizing majority's decision to allow rewriting of restrictive employment
contracts) .
172. See supra Part III.C.2.

